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Policing 2007 1(1):38-42; doi:10.1093/police/pam014
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Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press.

Policing Terrorism in the UK

Garry Hindle*

* Head of Terrorism and International Homeland Security and Resilience at the Royal United Services Institute. E-mail: GarryH@rusi.org

Garry Hindle is Head of Terrorism and International Homeland and Security & Resilience at the Royal United Services Institute. In this article he describes how existing policing responses to terrorism are both complex and incomplete, and that plans to build a consistent, nationwide capability to police terrorism remains unclear in light of the collapse of the forces merger proposal.

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below.


    New territory and responsibility
 
The depth and breadth of the terrorist threat in the UK has now been the subject of regular comment by the Government.1 Such comments broadly revolve around the number of investigations ongoing, the number of individuals ‘of interest’ and estimates of the wider problem that is thought to exist. The United Kingdom's police forces bear a primary, front-line responsibility to counter this threat; a responsibility that has brought an array of roles and challenges and one which is still a work in progress.

Under the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy police forces contribute to twenty one key workstreams and forty two key actions.2 This provides an important degree of strategic instruction, but leaves the profoundly more difficult tasks of definition and implementation open. At the core of many of the changes required is the problematic shift to the pre-emption or interception of terrorism. A shift necessitated by the suicidal component of . . . [Full Text of this Article]


    Investigative capacity: issues and developments
 

    Back to the gap
 

    Proposals/potentialities
 

    Time-frame for change
 

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