Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press.
The Lessons of Policing in Iraq—a Personal Perspective
* MOD Research Fellow at St Andrews University's Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, UK. E-mail: aa41{at}st-andrews.ac.uk
Affi Ashraf is a Research Fellow at St Andrews University's Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. As a senior officer in the British armed forces he served in Iraq and has since been involved in coordinating the UK's contribution to the reform of the Iraqi Police Service. This article examines the challenges of policing in Iraq's post-conflict environment, and highlights the lack of consensus on the appropriate policing model to adopt.
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Introduction |
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Of the many views expressed on the current war in Iraq, one of the least contentious is that it is a rich seam for lessons. A tenacious insurgency and the greatest concentration of terrorist activity in modern times are often cited as the causes of Iraq's problems. The role that the breakdown of law and order played in creating the current situation remains to be fully explored, as does the failure, so far, to create an effective police force. On the other hand, the extreme nature of the situation in Iraq has exposed the weaknesses and limits of the UK's ability to provide international policing assistance in an insecure environment.
This paper is based on the observations of the author who served in Iraq between October 2004 and February 2005, and it considers how Iraq's situation, immediately before the invasion, affected Security Sector Reform activity, and how that knowledge may improve our understanding of the concept. It explores how shortfalls in the planning process delayed activity and how a subsequent rush to achieve success risked sustainability of police reform. The many challenges facing the UK's contribution to Iraqi Police Service development are discussed in terms of availability of British police volunteers, recognition and reward and the differences in perceptions of risk. Finally, the paper explores the strategic issues of choosing the right style of policing in an environment of severe terrorism, rampant crime and fragile governance, as well as the pitfalls of defining and measuring success in such circumstances.
Some of the conclusions and recommendations made in this paper were also addressed by HMG's Strategic Task Force into international police assistance. The results of the task force have not been discussed in this paper as they were published after the period covered by it. Notwithstanding the Task Force, most of the points raised remain relevant to debate and policy development.
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Relevance of background to security sector reform |
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The challenges faced by the Iraqi police today have their roots in the role and responsibilities of their antecedents in previous decades. During the late 1970s, Iraq emerged as a leader in the Arab world. It developed an educated workforce, a fledgling industrial base and one of the region's most sophisticated communication and transport infrastructures. All this was inspired by Saddam Hussein, managed by his Baath party and funded by Iraq's burgeoning oil wealth. The totalitarian nature of Iraq's regime resulted in tight control over public opinion and behaviour. The police and intelligence services were the primary instruments of control and were subordinate to local party structures and the Army. A by-product of these relatively stringent political controls was that law and order was of a high standard with crime and public corruption at low levels compared to regional norms.
Iraq had adopted the French inquisitorial system of investigation. Its judiciary was regarded as independent and effective albeit politically controlled. The police were, in keeping with other Third World forces, prone to petty corruption, human rights abuses and torture, but were, nevertheless, perceived by the public as competent within their limited role. That role was limited not just by investigatory responsibility but also because the police played a small part in internal security. Responsibility for security and serious crime was spread across a number of agencies including secret police units with extra legal authority and armed paramilitary units capable of dealing with uprisings. Serious criminal matters and national security issues invariably involved a plethora of intelligence agencies and special units. Where large-scale rebellion was likely, the army was utilized. The conventional police were relegated to dealing with traffic offences, social disputes and petty crime.
The decade of sanctions that followed the first Gulf War devastated the country. Financially it was bankrupt. Politically, the Baath party had to resort to a combination of bribery and increasingly extreme suppression to maintain authority. Smuggling became a state sanctioned industry and the black-market, a major part of the Iraqi economy. Towards the end of the period the situation became dire due to poverty and the lack of essential services, especially medical care. A country that imported prostitutes now faced the humiliation of exporting its women as sex workers. It was a country and people in a state of distress.
The relevance of this background to Security Sector Reform in Iraq was not and, possibly, is still not understood. Security Sector Reform is defined as the transformation of a security system in a manner consistent with democracy and principles of good governance.1 This means, amongst other things, that security policy is linked to political and economic development with consequential emphasis on the well-being of the population. A pre-condition for creating the necessary development is state stability. Seen in reverse, the decade of UN sanctions, the regular military attacks to enforce the No Fly Zone and the Saddam regime's brutal repression and increasing corruption had weakened Iraq politically and economically and its population had become impoverished. The country was teetering on the edge of a stable state immediately before the invasion. The invasion and its immediate aftermath pushed Iraq over the edge as a secure nation state.
One possible lesson from Iraq is that a combination of harsh international sanctions and brutal political oppression created a brittle society that became susceptible to the breakdown of law and order following the overthrow of Saddam. That society needed more time, resources and effort to reform than a comparable society that had not experienced such sustained trauma.
Why then was this situation not fully recognized before and after the invasion? The Security Sector Reform concept was developed principally in Europe and was not widely studied in the US as a discrete discipline. This is somewhat ironic, as the US had previously been involved in at least five instances of state building since the Second World War including the mammoth and highly successful reconstructions of Germany and Japan. Rigorous academic analysis of these five cases had been carried out in the US providing useful information on a number of indicators for success ranging from budgetary expenditure to policing ratios for given populations in occupied countries. It appears that this information and the associated lessons were not exploited in the decision to invade Iraq, in invasion planning and in managing the subsequent reconstruction. But the UK also failed to highlight the potential pitfalls before the invasion. That failure may partly be explained by the fact that the Security Sector Reform concept has been shaped by considering the conditions that exist in a country following regime change rather than the conditions that preceded it. There is obvious scope to update the Security Sector Reform concept in the light of the Iraq experience.
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Planning |
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A slow start
Pre-war planning for the reconstruction of Iraq is now generally considered to be woefully inadequate. The little that took place was focused on humanitarian issues such as food, water and refugees rather than Security and the rule of law. The failure to grasp the importance of the rule of law in security and development manifested itself in a number ways. The outlawing of the Baath party, membership of which was ubiquitous because career progression in public service depended upon it. This meant that most officials involved in Iraq's policing, legal and penal system suddenly became outlaws. The effective disbandment of the police, the freeing of criminals from jails and the tacit approval of looting established an atmosphere of lawlessness and a vacuum of authority. In the race to fill this vacuum, extra-legal groups such as criminal gangs, militias and insurgents proved to be speedier than the Coalition backed state authorities. Creation of this void of authority on top of the socially corrosive effects of the international sanctions dramatically increased neighbourhood and national crime. This activity adversely affected the ability of the police to maintain order and generated the need for increasingly invasive police powers and tactics—both of which ran counter to the Coalition aspiration of a policing system based on democratic norms.
Although work on police reform began within weeks of the formation of the Coalition Provisional Authority2, serious planning, training and equipping of the new Iraqi police did not take place until the establishment of the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team in the spring of 2004. By this stage, the Iraqi Police Service was on the back foot and could not seize the initiative. Its failure to effectively tackle crime and security discredited it and emboldened criminals and terrorists. During 2004–2005 it was common for new police stations to be attacked by insurgents who were better armed and organized than the police. The newly supplied cars, weapons and equipment would be seized and police officers either killed or recruited by the insurgents. In this way, the disparity of equipment, experience and the will to win progressively shifted in favour of the terrorists. Much of this could have been avoided with the involvement of police and Security Sector Reform specialists early in the planning process and in post-invasion strategic decision-making.
A rush to succeed
The US's end state for Iraq required it to be a stable democracy, at peace with its neighbours. This required Iraqi society, government and the criminal justice to radically change from command-based systems within a totalitarian regime to open democratic institutions. Making this change needed a transformation in behaviour and culture. Cultural changes invariably take years, if not decades, to implement. The timescales within the Coalition's security plans aimed initially for transition to full Iraqi Security control within a period of 2 to 3 years. Unsurprisingly, these targets were not met. The planning process lacked the patience necessary to create sustainable change in the newly formed Iraqi Police Service. To some extent Iraqi police will remain handicapped by this as it is continually being tasked to take over security responsibilities, in locations such as the provinces of Al Muthanna and Di Qar where Coalition forces are withdrawing, without being fully prepared. In every case, the police services have not had time to adopt and practice policing in the Security Sector Reform context. The future of such forces must naturally be precarious.
The Western politically inspired rush to complete the job in Iraq created a doctrinal tension between the active law enforcement approach of the UK military and the community based consensual approach of the UK police. This politically initiated tension reflected the fundamental difference in objectives (and therefore approach) of the two security services. The results of their efforts have satisfied neither—the Iraqi police is generally unable to establish law and order, let alone sustain it.
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Challenges facing the UK's contribution |
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Availability of UK police officer volunteers for Iraq
The UK does not have a deployable reserve of police officers to assist with international development. Local authorities establish officers for their own needs. In the interest of personal development and the desire to assist HMG, some forces allow their personnel to undertake secondments to countries as International Police Advisors to conduct reform. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) coordinates these secondments to a number of post-conflict countries including Kosovo, Palestine and Afghanistan. The high demand for British police officers in Iraq soon exhausted the available supply. Much effort was expended in encouraging UK forces to supply volunteers. Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) was proactive in this with officials visiting Iraq to assess the UK contribution as well as the procedures in place to ensure officers' safety. The visits included senior officers from a number of forces in order to persuade them to assist. Not all forces were persuaded.
The Metropolitan Police was the most high profile force that found itself unable to reconcile its duty of care obligations with the level of danger in Iraq (although it did contribute to the International Police Academy in Jordan). Other forces followed its example. These difficulties led to a greater reliance on specialist forces such as the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Police and the British Transport Police. Such forces arguably lacked individuals with the range of skills necessary to teach Iraqis community-based techniques. The British Army also attempted to fill gaps by using the Military Police to conduct training and mentoring. Their involvement too was not ideal as it gave out a mixed message about the subordination of police to the public and not the Army in the new Iraq.
To compensate for the shortfall in serving or suitable retired officers, the FCO contracted out some of its police training and mentoring activities to private security companies. These companies recruited police officers from the UK and some Commonwealth countries with the requisite skills and experience. The use of private security companies invariably raised questions about standards and value for money. In reality, the companies provided a generally good service. They had the added advantage of being responsive to customer needs. If a police trainer was not up to the job, he or she would be replaced. It was not so easy to get the right skills and attitudes when dealing with FCO sourced serving or retired volunteers, where it was largely a case of taking what was available. Moreover budgetary analysis showed that contractors provided value for money. However, politically, the preference was and remained for serving or recently retired officers.
Recognition and reward
Serving policeman volunteering for service in Iraq had few incentives. The extra money and leave they got barely compensated for the considerable danger and stress of working in an environment of extreme violence, continually for up to 6 weeks at a time. British police officers in Iraq acquire experiences and skills with the potential to improve the UK's policing capability. They learn about operating in a culturally different society, about operating under physical and psychological stress and about dealing with counter-insurgency and terrorism. They also know how to operate with the army, intelligence services and political and community leaderships. As a general rule, however, there was no official recognition in the UK of the value of the experience gained and no policy to exploit their competencies. For most, volunteering for a tour in Iraq was a career break. This tended to discourage all but the inexperienced and those who had achieved their career plateau.
Even though the UK Government eventually authorized a medal to mark the service of volunteers, over three years after the first officers deployed to Iraq, not a single medal had been issued. There is considerable potential to increase the number and quality of volunteers by improving the recognition and rewards offered. A policy by the donating police forces for the exploitation of the experience gained in Iraq by their officers would benefit both the forces and encourage the individuals involved.
Perceptions of risk
A major limitation on the effectiveness of the UK contribution was the disparity in the way safety risk was assessed in Iraq. The disparity between those police forces, which accepted ACPO's assessments and offered volunteers and those that did not, presented a recruitment problem. Of more significance were the operational difficulties arising out of the difference between the British Army and the FCO, under whose safety procedures the UK police contingent operated. Both employed dissimilar styles of risk management and different levels of personal protection. For example, a route the Army thought was safe for travel could be considered unsafe by the FCO safety staff. The UK police could not travel in certain types of Army vehicles. Essentially, the FCO system was risk averse while the Army preferred to balance risk between threat, mitigation measures and operational benefit. These differences occasionally caused frustration between the FCO and the Army as both relied on each other to achieve their tasks. Whenever the security situation worsened, the Army saw it as confirmation of a lack of progress in the training and mentoring of the Iraqi police and wanted the UK Police Advisors to speed up their activities. The Advisors, on the other hand would be restricted to the safety of bases until the FCO was confident of their safety. A common risk management system between the MOD and the FCO would have avoided these difficulties.
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Strategy |
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What is the right style of policing for Iraq?
The bulk of police training in the country was in line with Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT's) vision and strategy of a police officer whose training was targeted at public order and basic counter-terrorism duties. In the southeast, the UK-led effort emphasized community policing and Human Rights as a more sustainable way to win the fight against terrorism. Within the southeast sector, in the Italian controlled province of Di Qar, the Carabinieri conducted training in yet another way. Its distinctive features were difficult to identify for the casual visitor but it seemed to focus on basic tactical skills. A large number of Iraqi recruits trained at the International Police Training Academy in Jordan. This vast complex churned out hundreds of trained police officers every 8 weeks but adopted its own syllabus and style. There was no consistency across the country and none of these styles and syllabi proved to be ideal for Iraq.
A debate raged and continues about the appropriateness of UK police forces imparting their doctrine to countries in the grip of acute civil violence and possessing fragile governance capacity. Many felt that a Third Force such as the Gandameri or Caribinieri was more relevant to Iraq's needs. The argument has some merit, as those UK volunteers who had served with PSNI or the RUC tended to be amongst the most effective in understanding the Iraqi situation and in contributing to their counter-terrorism capability. These officers had experience of counter-terrorism in a sectarian environment. They understood the threats and pressure that Iraqi officers faced. They also understood the crucial importance of acquiring and using intelligence effectively in a terrorism context, and they knew how to coordinate action with the Army. Whether these officers were recruited directly by the FCO or via a private security contractor, the senior British police officer in Iraq would invariably deploy them in posts that exploited their valuable talents.
Matters would periodically come to a head when the security situation worsened. The UK would suggest that the north was slipping out of control because the US approach emphasized hard skills that alienated the local population. The US would claim that the soft approach to community policing was the reason why the police had failed to quell the rising tide of violence in the south. The bottom line was that no consensus existed on what skills and approach should be taught to a police force in Iraq's situation. Views on this question varied not just between countries but also between practitioners within the nations involved. This is an ideal topic for research and would benefit any future reform effort.
Measuring and defining success
Little thought was given to defining and measuring success. Initially, numbers of trained police officers were considered the primary indicator of success. When the security situation worsened despite increasing numbers, the effectiveness of the Reform activity was questioned. It was natural for the army to compare their contribution to Reform and training of the Iraqi Army, with the FCO led effort to train the Iraqi police. Iraqi soldiers appeared less corrupt, more loyal and less likely to support insurgents and criminals. The obvious conclusion for the army to draw was that the UK police trainers were failing to do their job well. That conclusion was debated at the highest levels in Whitehall.
It took an individual who was neither a policeman nor a soldier to point out to officials in Whitehall that there was a fundamental difference in how soldiers and police officers relate to society. Iraqi soldiers were separated from their communities. They were housed in barracks where they bonded with their comrades. When asked to take action against fellow Iraqis it was invariably against people whom they did not know and who would not know them. Police officers, on the other hand, lived and worked amongst their community. If that community housed insurgents and powerful criminals then officers had to balance their professional obligations against their own safety. For most, that balance invariably tipped in favour of their safety. For a few, there was more security in siding with terrorism and crime than in fighting them. This process allowed for infiltration of whole units such as the Department for Internal Affairs in Basra. The differences in progress of reform of the Iraqi Army and Police were, therefore, not caused by a lack of effort but by a lack of resource and time. Civil security structures are more complex than military ones and take longer to rebuild.
Perhaps the Western vision of community-based police forces does not work in cases of extreme terrorism and rampant corruption. Perhaps the answer is to isolate the force from the community it polices, at least until security and law and order reach a level where officers can live within a community and serve with consent. Linked to these questions is the question of whether a French or Italian style Third Force is a more appropriate model for the Iraqis.
The justice, penal and intelligence parts of the picture
The police are only one part of the criminal justice system, which in turn is part of the security sector. Reform of the police must therefore be synchronized with that of the judiciary, prisons and intelligence services. No obvious synchronization existed in Iraq. Priorities tended to be resource-led and the judiciary received relatively little attention. Although no hard evidence existed, anecdotal material suggested that Iraqi police forces dispensed their own justice in the absence of effective courts. Prison reform, on the other hand, was one of the few accepted security sector successes in the UK controlled region. A small number of UK prison officers established a programme of recruitment, training and training the trainers in the prisons of southeastern Iraq with much success. Why this was so is a point worth exploring in more detail than this article allows. In general terms, it was easier to insulate prison officials than police officers from the men of crime and violence. Intelligence service reform, however, moved at a slower pace. It also tended to be geared towards providing political and military intelligence rather than supporting an intelligence-led policing strategy. Amongst the most effective intelligence capabilities created for the Iraqi police was a ‘Tips’ service allowing citizens to report suspicious activity and individuals. It was largely based on the Northern Ireland model and was initially manned and latterly supervised by UK International Police Advisers in Baghdad. That success was not replicated in other parts of the country. The current strategic failure in Iraq could stem from neglecting a fundamental lesson of counter-terrorism: terrorism can only be constrained by the military; it needs to be confronted by a community-based, intelligence-led police and defeated by an effective political process. Success in police reform can only occur with commensurate successes in the justice, penal and intelligence institutions.
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Conclusions |
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TopIntroductionRelevance of background to...PlanningChallenges facing the UK's...StrategyConclusions |
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The sustained trauma faced by Iraq before the invasion increased the time, resources and effort needed to reform the country. Our current understanding of the Security Sector Reform concept looks forward instead of backwards and leads to an underestimation of the challenges in store. There is obvious scope to update the concept in the light of the Iraq experience. Poor planning and slow initial progress allowed insurgents and terrorists time to organize and achieve victories that strengthened their inventory, tactics and morale. Future intervention plans would benefit from the inclusion of policing and Security Sector Reform specialists early in the planning process. That process should exploit lessons from previous nation building experiences, most important of which is that democrat systems take many years to establish. Giving new governments and inexperienced police forces independent responsibility too early risks their sustainability.
The experience of Iraq highlighted the paucity of volunteers for international development in high-risk countries. The UK needs a strategy for either increasing the numbers of volunteers or for placing greater reliance on contractor supplied manpower. That strategy must first consider if current UK police doctrine and experience is best suited to teaching a force that faces acute civil violence. Continuing to support such projects, however, will require more recognition and reward for volunteer officers than currently exists.
Differences in perceptions of acceptable risk prevented some UK forces from allowing their officers to work in Iraq. A similar difference between the FCO and the British Army occasionally curtailed reform activity. A common safety management system could overcome these unnecessary hurdles.
No consensus exists on what skills and approach should be taught to a police force in Iraq's situation. This is an ideal topic for further research. Should such police forces be isolated from their communities until security and law and order reaches a level where policing with consent is possible? In the meantime, should countries like France and Italy who possess para-military police forces do developmental work instead? Whatever policing style is employed, success in police reform can only occur with commensurate successes in the justice, penal and intelligence capabilities.
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Notes |
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1 See ‘Developing Iraq Security Sector—the Coalition Provisional Authorities Experience’, National Defence Research Institute (RAND: 2005) P. 6.
2 The US-led administration that governed Iraq after the fall of Baghdad.
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