Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press.
Policing Terrorism in the UK
* Head of Terrorism and International Homeland Security and Resilience at the Royal United Services Institute. E-mail: GarryH{at}rusi.org
Garry Hindle is Head of Terrorism and International Homeland and Security & Resilience at the Royal United Services Institute. In this article he describes how existing policing responses to terrorism are both complex and incomplete, and that plans to build a consistent, nationwide capability to police terrorism remains unclear in light of the collapse of the forces merger proposal.
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New territory and responsibility |
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 Top New territory and responsibility Investigative capacity: issues...Back to the gapProposals/potentialitiesTime-frame for change |
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The depth and breadth of the terrorist threat in the UK has now been the subject of regular comment by the Government.1 Such comments broadly revolve around the number of investigations ongoing, the number of individuals ‘of interest’ and estimates of the wider problem that is thought to exist. The United Kingdom's police forces bear a primary, front-line responsibility to counter this threat; a responsibility that has brought an array of roles and challenges and one which is still a work in progress.
Under the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy police forces contribute to twenty one key workstreams and forty two key actions.2 This provides an important degree of strategic instruction, but leaves the profoundly more difficult tasks of definition and implementation open. At the core of many of the changes required is the problematic shift to the pre-emption or interception of terrorism. A shift necessitated by the suicidal component of the terrorist tactics in evidence. This has two main implications for policing. One is the need to act upon third-party and/or inconclusive evidence where the potential consequences of not doing so are unacceptable. Second is the need to extend the policing reach into communities to inhibit extremism at source. Police are required to develop capabilities and capacities not only to counter the existing threat but also to improve conditions in which it may develop further, to ‘help communities protect themselves and counter the efforts of extremist radicalizers’.3 A further essential requirement at the local level is to ensure that the effect on the broader community is minimized through operations conducted with sensitivity and discretion.
A wider aim, under the prevent pillar of the strategy, is to deter those that may facilitate terrorism. Contributing to ensuring that sympathies lie with the potential victims of an attack rather than with those being arrested and investigated needs to be a key consideration. This is a significant shift for policing, imposing a responsibility of a new order that must be addressed in conjunction with necessary, more conventional, developments in capability. The proportion of funds devoted to this kind of ‘prevention’ however remains low. It appears that a slowness to spend and develop capability in this area arises from a lack of clarity and guidance on how to achieve this deterrent objective.
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Investigative capacity: issues and developments |
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Terrorism investigations require an increasing level of consideration and sophistication at the local and international levels. Of the terrorism investigations that have been to varying degrees publicized, the overwhelming majority have involved more than one police force and liaison with international counterparts and IGOs. A recurring theme has been investigations into the foreign connections and travel of suspects. This adds delay and frustration to ongoing investigations and poses difficulties where incomplete information requires action without certainty. A single investigation can now require an enormous degree of capacity stretching across the country. Operation Overt, the alleged airline bomb plots of August 2006, involved twenty seven police forces across England and the range of operations involved is estimated to have cost the Thames Valley Police and Metropolitan Police services alone £7.4 and £20.6 millions respectively. While the funding for such operations has been increased greatly, more problematic structural issues remain.
The Metropolitan Police Service's (MPS) Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) continues to grow since its creation through the merger of the MPS Anti-Terrorism (SO12) and Special Branches (SO13). Its head, DAC Peter Clarke is also the National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism. Current convention in major investigations is for forces to invite the National Coordinator to advise on and coordinate investigations that fall outside the MPS area. The norm preserves the ‘sovereignty’ of individual forces while permitting the involvement of the most experienced and well-resourced force. This principle of independence is becoming increasingly irrelevant and potentially obstructive in the conduct of counter terrorism investigations. While the invitation has become a convention, it is effectively a patch in this context, providing coordination and a degree of capacity raising, but not a clear, reliable level of accountability.
The establishment of regional counter-terrorism units in Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester continue to add capacity and connectivity. The Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit led operations around the alleged kidnap plot in Birmingham in January 2007. However, there is some way to go yet in terms of staffing, authority and coordination with local forces and other organizations. One issue revolves around the transfer of specialists from the forces to hubs; while the aim in the longer term is to increase capacity, there are currently a finite number of those with relevant expertise, which individual forces are reluctant to ‘lose’. Supporting these units are Regional Intelligence Cells (RICS) which have grown in number, with appropriate geographical focus, to develop access in key areas. These aim to garner information from what is recognized as perhaps the most important object in counter terrorism; the communities in which potential terrorist extremism can receive support and sympathy.
Despite this structural progress, there currently exists no nationwide database for the sharing of counter terrorism intelligence, though this has been mandated by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) for some years. Personal relationships and communications are instead relied upon and while this may have been successful, the necessary vulnerability that it entails hardly needs stressing. According to one practitioner, the absence of this tool highlights difficulties within ACPO where individuals carry out their ACPO functions in addition to full-time responsibilities within their home force.
Discussions of pre-charge detention periods often fail to take account of one of the key reasons extension is argued for; that the resources to conduct necessary inquiries within the given time-frame has often not been sufficient. What is more, there is recognition that the disruption of a large scale or multiple plots could overwhelm investigative capacity to the extent that the existing maximum detention period would be rendered grossly insufficient. Officials are however apparently unwilling to present arguments for extending the detention period in terms of their compensating for capacity shortfalls.
It is what has not happened that should provide important guidance on the urgency and scale of developing nationwide capabilities and connectivity. Given the number of ongoing investigations and if estimates of ‘unknowns’ are even remotely accurate, a requirement for the simultaneous disruption of major attacks, or if one attacked followed another closely, policing could be stretched to breaking point. It is not merely a case of spending more but introducing efficiencies and connectivity to raise capability—a massively more difficult proposition than increasing budgets.
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Back to the gap |
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TopNew territory and responsibilityInvestigative capacity: issues...Back to the gapProposals/potentialitiesTime-frame for change |
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The proposed force mergers abandoned by the Home Office in 2006 promised a long due overhaul of policing structures in England & Wales. However, short-termist disagreements over funding and precise form dominated and eventually doomed the proposals. Force mergers would have yielded considerable benefits in counter-terrorism functions, outlined in the wider review of benefits conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC).4
Of the options discussed in the HMIC's ‘Closing the Gap’ review of the ‘fitness for purpose’ of the forces, mergers were seen overall to be the best option, against alternatives of more extensive collaboration, lead forces (for regions or capabilities) and federations of forces. This was the most organizationally sound, need-led and ultimately efficient and strategically effective solution. Mergers were planned along optimum lines which in many cases combined smaller forces with larger, pooling resources and capabilities, whilst preserving the successful Basic Command Unit structure.
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Proposals/potentialities |
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TopNew territory and responsibilityInvestigative capacity: issues...Back to the gapProposals/potentialitiesTime-frame for change |
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In a discussion at the Royal United Services Institute, HM Inspector of Constabulary Denis O'Connor referred to the broad spectrum across which the police must operate to counter terrorism. Specifically, that police must operate across a spectrum of ‘reach and connectivity’, far beyond that which has been required previously.5
A proposal from ACPO is to mandate the National Coordinator to take command of terrorism investigations throughout England and Wales. This faces some considerable opposition within some forces but would provide clear lines of accountability and authority for investigations. Though not yet in any great evidence, the potential for investigations to be disrupted due to a lack of clarity over responsibility and authority is a current risk. This measure alone however does not address resourcing across the forces and connectivity between the various organizations involved.
Existing problems remain; The lack of a dedicated coordinator of capability building, specifically within ACPO; and fundamentally, a lack of clarity on the best way to proceed to build cross-force capabilities. Building the investigative capacity within individual forces, as is historic convention, would be prohibitively expensive and inefficient. On the opposite end of the scale, a new organization would put at risk the growing effectiveness of existing structures and may result in ruinous political battles.
In a HMIC report, Denis O'Connor offers a variant of the collaborative and lead force approaches described in ‘Closing the Gap’, more limited in scope but deeper, as an option to provide improvements in capability and connectivity in the shortest time. In this proposal, forces and national organizations and structures would contribute according to their proficiency and ability to provide capability economically.6 Whether such a complex solution can be sufficiently well defined and implemented to be effective is an open issue. If so, it could potentially provide a useful model for cooperative structures in other areas than counter-terrorism.
In the longer term, it may be that the Serious and Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) could have its role extended further into the domain of counter terrorism. SOCA currently has remit in counter terrorism only in relation to financing. A revolution in terms of policing for the UK, SOCA has a broad, nationwide mandate to build intelligence networks and investigative and disruptive capabilities, with an international reach and presence. It is not therefore inconceivable that additional responsibilities relating to counter terrorism may be farmed out to SOCA, depending on its own development.
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Time-frame for change |
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TopNew territory and responsibilityInvestigative capacity: issues...Back to the gapProposals/potentialitiesTime-frame for change |
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The assessments and reviews of capability required to deliver change will in part build upon the extensive inspections already carried out. However, determining configurations for collaboration, implementing the necessary structures and processes and developing the essential political buy-in are all considerable challenges.
Developing more sophisticated responses to counter terrorism will come given time and experience. As one senior practitioner commented ‘in the 70s our response to a report of drug use in a home would be to break the door down and make arrests; we should expect that our response to reports and intelligence on extremism will improve correspondingly over time’.
However, there is nothing like that amount of time during which to improve responses to the existing terrorist threat. Identifying the way forward for reform and building the political will for change must help to ensure that the primary driver for change is not the next successful attack.
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Notes |
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1 A leaked document of 2004 put the number of active supporters of al Qaeda at ‘up to 10,000’, reported in the Telegraph, 31 May 2004. DAC Peter Clarke commented in a BBC documentary in 2006 that the number of individuals of interest were ‘into the thousands’. Director General of the Security Service, Eliza Manningham-Buller, on the thirty active plots and 1,600 individuals currently under investigation.
2 ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy’, HM Government, July 2006.
4 ‘Closing the gap: A review of the fitness for purpose of the current structure of policing in England & Wales’, HM Inspector of Constabulary Denis O'Connor, September 2005.
5 ‘Intercepting terrorism: Combining effectively, responding collectively’, HM Inspector of Constabulary Denis O'Connor, February 2006.
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