Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press.
Opinion |
Australia and the Changing Terrorist Threat
* Assistant Commissioner, Commander, Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command, New South Wales, Australia
Assistant Commissioner Nick Kaldas of New South Wales Police outlines Australia's response to international terrorism and the role of the newly established Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command.
It is a fact that almost universally policing in a counter-terrorism context and in the post-9/11 era has undergone a fundamental shift in focus. The reality of 9/11 was reinforced by many other attacks to follow, London 7/7 and 21/7, Bali one and two, Mumbai, and Madrid to name but a few.
All of these attacks have focussed law enforcement on a very real threat, which can no longer be ignored, and must be faced head-on, and with adequate resources and a will to succeed.
On a recent visit to Sydney, some New York Police Department (NYPD) officers expressed the view that until such time as you are a victim, this threat will not be taken seriously enough. Not by government, not by the public, and not by law enforcement. Our preparedness should prove that this is not the case.
In tackling this threat, it must also be acknowledged by law enforcement that the nature of the threat itself has changed, and is evolving rapidly and dramatically. Prior to 9/11, with attacks such as the African Embassy bombings against the USA, and the USS Cole bombing in Yemen, it was relatively easy to identify the enemy as Al Qaeda, and to pinpoint in a geographical sense where the enemy was. That is in Afghanistan, under the rule of the Taliban. It was then relatively straightforward to order attacks in retaliation.
Following 9/11, and the attack on Afghanistan by the Coalition forces, Al Qaeda central has now disbanded as a physical entity with a centralized geographic command location. In disbanding the centralized group, the Coalition, unintentionally, created an enemy which is now harder to pin down, in that there is no longer a geographic location where the enemy resides, and where strikes could be directed. Al Qaeda's leadership fled in disarray, and was either killed or hid in remote regions. That entity no longer directs, coordinates, nor finances attacks on the west. It merely acts as an inspiration for an enemy within.
Doubtless, there are those in our communities, small minorities no doubt, who are inspired by Al Qaeda, and who now act alone, without direction from elsewhere. They are often what is described as self radicalized, and because they do not take direct orders from anyone, they do not need to communicate with anyone, making the task of interception very difficult for law enforcement. We are, in effect, now fighting a battle for hearts and minds.
So what has been done in the Australian environment? In this State, the effort is structured along the lines adopted nationally and falls into four pillars: Prevention, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. We have established the Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command (CTSTC), under the leadership of an Assistant Commissioner, who has the necessary resources to address the task at hand, and who has the support of the executive of the Police Force and the Government of the day.
The CTSTC, in effect, has all the necessary ‘tools’ to focus on the issues at hand, including tactical elements, investigative and intelligence capacities in the anti-terrorism field. The Command acts as the primary conduit to the federal and international intelligence communities on terrorism. It also coordinates a rigorous, systematic exercise regime, which exercises every capability required for counter-terrorism, such as the tactical element, negotiators, and bomb management.
We recognize that the counter-terrorism environment demands collaboration and that government and police cannot deal with this threat in isolation. There has been a very conscious environmental scan, which has led us to the establishment of a number of new areas within the Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command. These include a Community Contact Unit, focussing on communities of interest, a business liaison area, and units focussing on critical infrastructure protection, transport, places of mass gathering and icons. These units will effectively reach out to all the stakeholders in this field, and with whom contact will now be much more regular, structured and effective.
It is also essential to recognize the crucial role the media play in these events and not to view them as an ‘enemy’. They have a legitimate role in the process, and are entitled to information, within reason and boundaries, to keep the public informed and to dispel rumour. This media management capacity is now part of the capabilities set down nationally, and is exercised along with other capabilities.
There are other factors to consider: the emergence of the Internet as a mobilizing vehicle, an ubiquitous tool with unlimited potential for good and evil; the radicalizing effect of overseas events; and the hot-house environment which often lends itself to the radicalizing process in jails. All of these issues require a collaborative approach to be effectively met and defeated. The battle must be seen as a longer-term effort, and not one to fit in with a 3-year business planning cycle. We face an enemy who thinks in terms of millennia and prepares accordingly. It is essential the law enforcement and intelligence community think likewise, and direct energies towards a long-term commitment of effort. To do otherwise is simply inviting failure.
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