Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press.
Police and the Prevention of Terrorism
* University of New Jersey, USA. E-mail: RVGclarke{at}aol.com
** University of New York, New York, USA. E-mail: grnamwen{at}aol.com
It is becoming clear that the police have an important role in preventing terrorism. They are in a good position to learn about and investigate local terrorist threats, and they can work to ensure that vulnerable targets in their jurisdictions are protected. Filling the first of these functions, investigation of terrorists, will require police to extend their normal community policing activities and improve their handling of information. Filling the second function, protecting vulnerable targets, will require greater adjustments. They will need to become more expert in crime prevention and security matters, and they will have to develop partnerships with businesses and a wide range of public and private agencies. However, these changes are consistent with current best practices in policing.
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Introduction |
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It has been said that the 9/11 attacks in the United States changed everything and this is certainly true for the police. It has become increasingly clear that national security agencies can no longer work alone in preventing future attacks. They must work in partnership with other public and private agencies, most importantly with local police. The police can identify potential terrorists living or operating in their jurisdictions, help to protect vulnerable targets and they can coordinate the first response to terror attacks. These are heavy new responsibilities that significantly expand the workload of already busy police forces. Many forces welcome the challenge of meeting these responsibilities, but in any case they cannot be shrugged off because elected officials and the public will increasingly expect that their police are prepared.
The case for the essential involvement of local police in counter-terrorism has been made in the United States by Kelling and Bratton (2006): They have argued that local police play a critical role in defeating terrorism, which they claim is not much different from other crime. They go on to argue that: ‘Counter-terrorism has to be woven into the everyday workings of every department. It should be included on the agenda of every meeting, and this new role must be imparted to officers on the street so that terrorism prevention becomes part of their everyday thinking’ (Kelling and Bratton, 2006: 6). This is a tall order. We know that terrorist attacks are extremely rare events—much rarer even than murders, for example. And many police jurisdictions, particularly in the United States, would be unlikely to attract the terrorists' attention. But Kelling and Bratton are correct to this extent: local police cannot risk the lives of people in their community. They have been, and will be held responsible should a disaster occur. It makes sense, therefore, for them to plan ahead for terrorism, and even better sense to fold these plans into everyday police practice.
But what should they actually do? In brief, we think they must: (a) collect intelligence about possible terrorist activity; (b) ensure that vulnerable targets are protected; and (c) be ready to respond in the event of an attack. The last of these is uncontroversial and will not be discussed here. Rather, we will discuss the first two tasks, both of which, in their different ways, are focused on prevention. We welcome this focus. Because of the devastating consequences of terrorism, prevention assumes far greater importance than for other crimes where bringing perpetrators to justice may be equally important. But there is another general point to be made about prevention—police should guard against devoting the bulk of their efforts to gathering intelligence at the expense of effort on protecting targets. Gathering intelligence about potential terrorists might be congruent with their usual business, but devoting their efforts exclusively, or even predominantly, to ‘taking out’ terrorists is likely to be unproductive for reasons that we will discuss. Devoting effort to protecting targets, on the other hand, is a less familiar role for police and, in fact, will require them to develop new skills and expertise. But assuming that terrorism will always remain a threat, communities must develop long-term plans to protect their most vulnerable targets, and these plans ought to be led by the police. We will be giving some pointers to how they must set about this task.
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’Taking out’ the terrorists |
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Regular police practice, too, often assumes that arresting offenders is the same as preventing crime, when in fact this is not the case. Despite the best efforts of police, currently only a tiny proportion of crimes are followed by arrest and it is unclear how this proportion could be significantly increased (Heaton, 2000). In any case, decades of criminological research have failed to establish a relationship between severe punishment and reduced crime. The best known example is the lack of statistical evidence that capital punishment deters murder. Offenders think they will not be caught and therefore do not take seriously the risk of severe punishment, or they do not care if they are caught because they are so drunk or enraged. Finally, the supply of offenders is never-ending. Five to ten percent of every new youth cohort will turn out to be regular offenders. So, however many offenders we arrest and imprison, others will soon take their place.
Some of the same reasons explain why it is dangerous to rely upon ‘taking out’ the terrorists—i.e. identifying them and then capturing or killing them—as the main defence against terrorism. Those who are willing to die for their beliefs are unlikely to be deterred by the risk of death or punishment. Catching them is difficult because terrorists are more careful than other criminals to conceal their activities. Even when their identities are known, they cannot always be caught, especially when they operate from overseas in countries sympathetic to their cause—witness the fruitless search for Osama bin Laden. They often cannot be tried in open court because of security concerns and they make very difficult prisoners, often turning their captivity into public relations disasters for their captors. Perhaps the greatest cost of imprisoning them is that their supporters feel justified in planning fresh outrages in order to force their release.
Killing terrorists carries even greater costs. It creates more bitterness among already hostile populations, making the underlying conflicts even harder to resolve. It justifies the terrorists' use of violence and supports the claim that they are fighting ruthless enemies. It turns them into martyrs and thus into potent recruiting symbols among the impressionable young men that terrorists seek to attract—young men who are currently streaming out of the madrassas in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and parts of Indonesia.
None of this means that they should not be hunted down or punished once caught. They deserve to be punished for their crimes. It can also be effective to kill terrorist leaders, particularly when they are charismatic individuals, who hold considerable sway over their followers and who cannot easily be replaced. Killing these leaders might effectively decapitate the organization and leave its body to wither, saving the lives of many innocent people. However, much of this is beyond the capabilities or even interest of local police, whose primary concern surely is the prevention of terrorist attacks from occurring in their own communities.
In sum, the take-them-out mindset is an impediment to incorporating terrorism prevention into everyday police practice and thinking. But what of intelligence-led policing (Gill, 2000, Maguire, 2000)? Does this not offer a way to overcome the drawbacks of the normal take-them-out thinking?
Intelligence-led policing
The term ‘intelligence-led policing’ was coined by the Kent Constabulary, which developed the concept in response to sharp increases in burglary and car theft at a time when police budgets were being cut. Senior managers believed that a small number of individuals were responsible for many of these crimes and that crime could best be cut by creating intelligence units to target the offenders for investigation and prosecution. They freed up resources for these units de-emphasizing the response to calls for service and, within 3 years, crime had dropped by one quarter. Intelligence-led policing is now the basis of the National Intelligence Model that has established new data collection and processing standards to be followed by the forty-three police forces in the United Kingdom.
In the United States, intelligence-led policing has captured attention as a way of combining discrete pieces of information about terrorist activities, that only make sense when considered together (Peterson, 2005). Popularized by the 9/11 Commission, intelligence-led policing can provide a way to ‘join up the dots’ (Gladwell, 2003). The New York Police Department is the leading exponent of intelligence-led policing to combat terrorism. It has more than 1,000 officers dedicated to counter-terrorism, it has hired intelligence and counter-terrorism experts, it has officers fluent in many foreign languages, it monitors news services and intelligence reports, and it has even stationed agents overseas in terrorism hot spots (Finnegan, 2005). No other police department in the United States can match this investment, though many large agencies, with hundreds or perhaps thousands of sworn officers, support an intelligence capacity. They might have a computerized database, intelligence officers, analysts, and an intelligence manager, though these are generally used to support investigations rather than to direct operations.
One fatal flaw of intelligence-led policing, especially the US version, is that it begins with the assumption that if the police simply collect as much information as they can, they will at some point identify suspicious activity (too many purchases of hydrogen peroxide for example), which will then lead to their destroying a terrorist cell or conspiracy. Much of this approach in the United States has also been accompanied by exhortations and reminders to people to report any suspicious activity or persons to a police hot line. Because this information is classified as ‘secret’ it is not known whether any information reported to a hot line has ever led to the discovery of a terrorist conspiracy. Furthermore, behaviours or events that are labelled as ‘suspicious’, are very vague, leaving open opportunities for individuals to exercise whatever prejudices or preconceptions they may have about what is suspicious or what a terrorist looks like. Under these circumstances, useless information is vastly more common than useful information. While the media often broadcast stories of intelligence successes resulting from tips received or surveillance undertaken, nobody hears about all the other people who were under surveillance, but to no result, and how many other apparently promising tips led nowhere.
Another flaw of intelligence-led policing is that it depends on individuals and agencies sharing information, which must then be collated and interpreted to produce intelligence. Indeed, the National Intelligence Model was designed to deal with just this problem, but there are many impediments to the timely sharing of terrorism information that the model cannot solve. One of these is that many local departments lack an intelligence capacity. They lack intelligence staff trained to a common curriculum and they lack appropriate technology (General Accounting Office, 2003). Many local agencies (again, particularly in the United States) even lack properly trained crime analysts, let alone intelligence analysts. In the general competition for resources, crime analysis must be considered more important than intelligence for most forces, simply because crime analysis can yield more obvious and consistent benefits for their everyday police work. As for technology, local forces may lack the computing equipment and software to facilitate a national intelligence data system and, even within the same force, there may be little interconnectivity among existing computer systems. Without such uniformity and interconnectivity, the dream of an electronic network across which the information collected can be quickly transmitted throughout the country remains just that—a dream.
An even greater impediment to information sharing than lack of technology or trained personnel might be human nature. Particularly in the early stages of an inquiry, investigators are likely to guard their information jealously. This is not just to prevent leaks that could jeopardize the investigation—secrecy is, after all, the hallmark of intelligence operations—but also for two other reasons. Investigators might doubt that ‘outsiders’ could help them and they would want to keep for themselves the considerable kudos resulting from the successful apprehension of terrorists. This might help to explain why the Organized Vehicle Crime Programme of the National Criminal Intelligence Service succeeded, at the cost of £1 million, in garnering only 184 items of information from local forces in a 2-year period——many of which were the results of specific requests made to police forces (Brown and Clarke, 2004; Brown et al., 2004).
Community policing
‘Local police officers have an everyday presence in the communities that they are sworn to protect. They ‘walk the beat,’ communicate regularly with the local residents and business owners, and are more likely to notice even subtle changes in the neighborhoods they patrol. They are in a better position to know responsible leaders in the Islamic and Arabic communities and can reach out to them for information or help in developing informants.’ (Kelling and Bratton, 2006: 1)
As this statement makes clear, the prescription for obtaining vital information and earning the trust of communities is talking regularly and informally with key members of the community, and it is just one of many endorsements of the role of community policing in counter-terrorism. Community policing requires beat police officers to be assigned to particular neighbourhoods so that they can spend considerable time there, getting to know residents or business owners and talking with them about local problems and troublesome individuals. It means they must be made responsible for reducing crime in their beats; that they must spend most of their working hours in these beats; and that they should pay close attention to what is bothering residents and business owners and do what they can to alleviate the problems. It requires management to select officers who are temperamentally suited to community policing, leaving them in place long enough to gain the trust of the community and to become familiar faces in the neighbourhood; matching officers with neighbourhoods—for example selecting officers who live close by or even in the neighbourhoods they serve, and ensuring that they have the language skills to communicate with minority residents; allowing officers flexible work hours and, whenever possible, not pulling them from their neighbourhoods for emergency duties elsewhere.
Finally, if they are to serve an intelligence function, officers must be trained in what signs to look for, and in sifting the few kernels of wheat from the overpowering chaff of useless information. Given the potential loss of life resulting from a terrorist attack, local communities might be less reticent in passing on information about suspicious activities than for conventional crime. In fact, gathering information through community policing has many advantages over traditional intelligence work. Specifically, it avoids: (a) undermining community trust though compiling unsubstantiated lists of suspects, (b) charges of profiling, phone-tapping and the legal and political encumbrances thereof, (c) costly and unproductive surveillance of suspects and places; (d) secret (and therefore suspect) operations and entrapment.
To ensure that community officers are meeting their goals, senior management will need to check the quality and frequency of intelligence reports that their officers supply. Management should also periodically check that officers are setting and meeting concrete crime and disorder reduction goals for their neighbourhoods. This could mean that the force crime analysis capabilities need to be strengthened by employing properly trained staff, providing them with up-to-date technology and preventing them from becoming mired in the production of routine reports (Clarke and Eck, 2003). Finally, managers will need to instil preventive values force-wide so that officers understand that problem solving is valued as much as detection and arrest and that it will be equally rewarded by recognition and promotion.
Immigrant communities
Immigrant communities provide the basic conditions for new arrivals to find their way in a strange country, particularly when they cannot speak the language. By the same token, they make it easier for foreign terrorists to get bank accounts, credit cards, get money from abroad and find places to live. The first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 was undertaken by individuals residing in a Jersey City immigrant community close to Manhattan and the 9/11 attackers all lived temporarily in or near immigrant areas that matched their ethnic and national backgrounds. So, there is little doubt that Al Qaeda's attacks were facilitated by the presence of immigrant communities in the United States, even if these communities were made use of inadvertently. In the UK immigrant communities, were the breeding grounds for the terrorists who attacked the London Underground in June 2005. Some of these communities might also have been a source of financial support for Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda's extensive revenue raising operations through charities and mosques in immigrant communities is well documented (Napoleoni, 2005). In some cases, it also seems that money raised within immigrant communities to assist charities in their home countries has been diverted into the hands of terrorists without the communities’ knowledge.
It is clear, therefore, that in seeking information about possible terrorist attacks the police must pay special attention to immigrant communities, but heavy-handed or insensitive actions could easily make matters worse. Though the vast majority of immigrants are hostile to terrorism, they might feel threatened, become resentful and fail to cooperate with the authorities. These dangers are easier to avoid when community policing ideals inform the police approach rather than a take-them-out mindset, or even the application of intelligence-led policing. Community policing would also help protect immigrant communities from victimization resulting from the fear of terrorism. Every time there is news of a foiled terror plot, or whenever the terror alert is ramped up, immigrants become fearful—not just frightened of being victims of terrorism, but of being targeted by the authorities with further checks and restrictions and by the local population with hostility and even hate.
Protecting these communities and providing them with ‘reassurance’ (Innes, 2004, Morris, 2006), while at the same time ensuring they do not harbour or support terrorism, presents police with a difficult balancing act for several reasons, including that new immigrants often bring with them a fear and distrust of the police; many immigrants have little understanding of civil rights and law enforcement; language barriers prohibit effective communication and trust between immigrants and police, and immigrants fear that contact with police will threaten their immigration status. Nevertheless, there is much the police can do to overcome these barriers and implement community policing successfully in immigrant communities. These actions include: establishing police sub-stations in larger communities; forging partnerships with schools, social services, and religious institutions to help younger immigrants, children of immigrants and elderly immigrants, and help keep them safe; using immigrant newspapers, religious institutions, and employers to communicate with those in immigrant communities who cannot attend community meetings; employing more interpreters and making police material available in the immigrants' languages; involving immigrant leaders in the design and implementation of cultural training for officers; working to overcome barriers preventing the recruitment of officers from these communities; clearly defining and publicizing policies of immigration law enforcement and training community advocates on the role and policies of the police; training the media so that they can more accurately report the dialogues taking place between police and immigrants (Chapman and Scheider Undated).
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Protecting vulnerable targets |
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The police may be familiar with the difficulties in identifying possible terrorists, but they know much less about the equally difficult task of identifying and protecting vulnerable targets. They are not alone in this since governments, pundits and academics have all eschewed this subject (Clarke and Newman, 2006). They are quickly put off by some very difficult questions that immediately present themselves. How can society organize the enormous task, and afford the enormous cost, of retrofitting the vast number of potential terrorist targets with adequate security? If it is impossible to protect everything, how can the choice be narrowed, so that at least the most vulnerable targets are protected? When these are protected will not the terrorists simply attack the ones that have not yet been protected?
In Outsmarting the Terrorists (Clarke and Newman, 2006) we drew on the situational crime prevention theory for providing answers to these questions (Clarke, 2005) and in Policing Terrorism: A Police Chief's Guide (Clarke and Newman, (in press)) we reframed these answers for American police practice. We summarize here the main points for a broader police audience under the two headings of ‘understanding the threat’ and ‘formulating a plan’.
Understanding the threat
Police must understand the nature of the threat if they are to formulate a plan for protecting targets from terrorism. The conceptual framework provided by situational crime prevention, discussed below, assists this understanding.
Treat terrorism as crime
It is sometimes argued that crime and terrorism are so different that the lessons in preventing crime can have little relevance in preventing terrorism. Is it not true that terrorists are better organized, more determined and more ruthless than ordinary criminals? Are they not also motivated by a ‘higher cause’ than most criminals who are usually seeking to benefit only themselves? Finally, is it not the case that acts of terrorism are better planned and on a larger scale than most acts of crime? Even if these points were true, the differences are merely ones of degree. Many of the acts of ‘organized crime’ are also well planned, large-scale and ruthless, and many terrorist operatives are as much motivated by commonplace ambitions (e.g. gaining respect, earning a living and enjoying a life of excitement) as by the political ideals of their leaders. In any case, crime has very varied motives. Much of it is driven by greed, but other motives drive rape, homicide, vandalism and assaults, to name but a few examples. In fact, the most basic motivator of crime—to achieve a benefit—is also shared by terrorism. For all these reasons, we reject a hard and fast division between crime and terrorism and prefer to regard the latter as ‘crime with a political motive’ (Clarke and Newman, 2006).
Clearly differentiate between different forms of terrorism
Each different kind of terrorist attack must be analysed separately. This is because, for example, suicide bombings in restaurants will have different requirements and constraints compared with suicide bombing in buses or trains. And both will differ greatly from hijackings of airliners or hostage takings at schools. These differences in terrorist methodology can be uncovered if the movements of a terrorist are traced, step by step, from the beginning to the end of his mission. As a result, the opportunities can be identified that terrorists must exploit in order to complete their attacks, and the decisions they make based on these, for example, their choice of target or weapon. It may be that there is insufficient information about how different terrorists implement their missions. In this case, police must ‘think terrorist’ by putting themselves in the shoes of the terrorist and imagining the steps needed to conduct a particular terrorist attack.
Analyse the attractiveness of targets
Research in situational prevention has shown that thieves are attracted to particular products and not others. These attractive features of products have led Clarke (1999) to identify several characteristics that make products ‘hot’ to steal. Similarly, the terrorist must make a choice of a target and some are more attractive than others. In theory, he could attack anything, but in practice, his activities are constrained by money, location, accessibility to the target, disagreements with other operatives and many more. We have summarized the attractive features of a target by the acronym EVIL DONE (Clarke and Newman, 2006):
- Exposed (the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center were sitting ducks)
- Vital (electricity grids, transportation systems, communications)
- Iconic (of symbolic value to the enemy, e.g. Buckingham Place, Statue of Liberty)
- Legitimate (terrorists' sympathizers cheered when Twin Towers collapsed)
- Destructible (the Twin Towers were thought to be indestructible, but not by the 9/11 hijackers)
- Occupied (Kill as many people as possible)
- Near (Within reach of terrorist group, close to home)
- Easy (the Murrah building in Oklahoma City was an easy target for McVeigh's car bomb placed within eight feet of its perimeter)
- Vital (electricity grids, transportation systems, communications)
Do not succumb to the displacement argument
It is often thought that the sole result of protecting the most vulnerable targets will be to displace attacks to unprotected ones. However, we know from studies in situational crime prevention that displacement is comparatively rare: it certainly does occur, but in a majority of cases it does not (Hesseling, 1994). For example, the passenger and baggage screening measures initially introduced in 1973 to prevent hijackings of aircraft between Cuba and the United States did not displace hijackings to other parts of the world (Clarke and Newman, 2006).1 Nor was there any apparent displacement to sabotage of airliners by smuggling bombs on board. Having said that, however, it must be recognized that the populations of terrorists (and criminals) do adjust their behaviour over time to take account of security interventions that have been introduced. One example of adaptation is the plot uncovered in London in September 2006 to use liquid explosives on US bound airplanes where the terrorists had figured out that, despite the heightened security since 9/11, there was no ban on carrying liquids on board. In response to this new threat, the authorities were forced to introduce new restrictions on liquids. As soon as a security loophole is discovered it must be closed. In fact, we believe that leaving opportunities open for attack invites attack.
Formulating a plan
It will be clear from the above that any plan to protect targets must be long-term. This, and other components of a protection plan are discussed below.
Develop plans for each police division (or basic command unit)
Divisional commanders should be made responsible for drawing up plans for protecting targets in their jurisdictions. These plans should be revised each year in the light of progress made in the preceding year and in response to any newly emerging threats. The task should encompass two separate but related activities:
- Identifying a small number of the most vulnerable targets and reducing this vulnerability, working with other stakeholders where necessary. For each target, police must think clearly about the kind of attack that is most likely and, by trying to think like a terrorist, consider how the attack would be undertaken and which specific vulnerabilities would be exploited.
- Providing basic security advice for other possible targets.
The task of formulating the plan should be adequately resourced and each division should ensure that the responsible officers are properly trained in crime prevention and security procedures. The divisional plans should be reviewed by central command to ensure that boundary issues of omission or overlap are addressed.
Plan for the long term
It is possible to reduce specific forms of terrorism and to eliminate particular terrorist groups. In time, however, other terrorist groups will rise and new forms of attack will be developed. New forms of attack will also result from technological or social change, which produce new opportunities for terrorism. Police must, therefore, formulate a long-term plan for continuously analysing target vulnerabilities in their jurisdictions, and for enhancing security where needed. In any case, the task of reducing opportunities for terrorism, which might seem impossible in the short term, becomes less daunting and more manageable when viewed as a long-term, probably permanent commitment.
Work closely with the private sector
Because the private sector often owns or manages the majority of targets, the police must partner with businesses, industries and other nongovernmental agencies in reducing opportunities for terrorism. In persuading private sector partners to improve security in their spheres of influence, the police should look for solutions that also benefit normal business operations (so-called dual benefit solutions). A ‘natural’ private partner is the local security industry. In fact, security professionals are responsible for the securing most of a jurisdiction's infrastructure, and they provide the visible crime control in the places where people spend much of their daily lives—at work, on public transport, in educational facilities and in shopping malls. They can also help police to identify needed resources, such as specialist consultants, when designing protection for some critical infrastructure, such as ports, reservoirs and water supply, and for facilities that need special handling, such as chemical factories or petroleum plants.
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Summary and conclusions |
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In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, terrorism has replaced crime as the greatest perceived threat to social order and, in the first 2 or 3 years after the attacks, it seemed as though intelligence agencies had usurped the police's role as the guardians of society. In the United States, this change in status was reflected in a diversion of funds from police to homeland security programs. More recently, things have begun to change again. Police leaders such as Kelling and Bratton (2006) have argued that police play a critical role in counter-terrorism because they are in the best position to learn about the emergence of local terrorist threats, to know which targets are most at risk, and to coordinate the first response to attacks. In this paper, we have focused on the first two of these functions, both concerned with prevention, which, because of the potential loss of life, is of great importance for terrorism. We have argued that an extension of community policing principles can best serve the first function (gathering intelligence), while situational crime prevention provides a useful framework for serving the second (the protection of vulnerable targets). To accommodate these functions, some police forces, especially in large cities with many attractive targets, might have to make considerable changes in their operating practices. They should embrace these changes because they are consistent with best practices in policing. They put a premium on prevention, on service to the community, on making full use of data and analysis, and on forming partnerships with other agencies and organizations, public and private. These practices will not only help meet the threat of terrorism, but will also help the police better serve their goals of fighting crime, protecting victims and providing reassurance to the public.
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Notes |
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1 Perhaps using CARVER, the protocol developed by the US Special Operations Forces in targeting an adversary's installations (for a brief description, see Clarke and Newman (in press)).
2 Somewhat greater support is given to displacement by other authors—for example, Enders and Sandler (1993; 2000; 2006), Enders et al. (1990), Cauley and Im (1988), Chauncey (1975), Dugan et al. (2005), and Lum et al. (2006)—but Clarke and Newman (2006) argue that this support rests upon questionable premises.
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