Policing Advance Access originally published online on June 5, 2008
Policing 2008 2(2):226-232; doi:10.1093/police/pan017
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Technology and Policing: Implications for Fairness and Legitimacy
* Peter Neyroud, Chief Executive, National Policing Improvement Agency, London, UK. E-mail: Peter.Neyroud{at}npia.pnn.police.uk
** Emma Disley, DPhil student, Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford
In this article, Peter Neyroud, Chief Executive of the NPIA, and Emma Disley, DPhil student at the Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford, argue that factual questions about the effectiveness of new technologies (such as DNA evidence, mobile identification technologies and computer databases) in detecting and preventing crime should not, and cannot, be separated from ethical and social questions surrounding the impact which these technologies might have upon civil liberties. This is due to the close inter-relationship between the effectiveness of the police and public perceptions of police legitimacy—which may potentially be damaged if new technologies are not deployed carefully. The authors argue that strong, transparent management and oversight of these technologies are essential, and suggest some factors to which a regime of governance should attend.
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Introduction |
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 Top Introduction Some examples of 'new...Ethical and social issuesTechnology, legitimacy and due...Moving forwardReferences |
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In this article, we wish to examine the implications of the use of new technologies by the police service in England and Wales, particularly, the potential impacts upon perceptions of police legitimacy. Essentially, we argue that factual questions about the effectiveness of new technologies in detecting and preventing crime should not be separated from ethical and social questions surrounding the impact which these technologies might have upon civil liberties or public support for the police. In this short piece, we hope to instigate a discussion of some important but neglected issues that arise from the recent growth in the number and sophistication of technologies available to the police service.
We begin by describing some of the databases, equipment and devices which we consider to be examples of ‘new technologies’. We then broach some of the social and ethical issues raised by the development and use of these technologies and consider how these issues might impact upon public perceptions of the legitimacy of the police. To conclude, we suggest some factors to which the governance and regulation of new technologies should attend, in order to preserve fairness and legitimacy in policing.
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Some examples of ‘new technologies’ |
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Strictly speaking, the National DNA Database (NDNAD), which was established in 1995, is not itself a new technology. But there is something new in techniques for the collection, storage and use of DNA evidence, and in the powers to take and store DNA, which are constantly being updated to reflect scientific developments. The UK's NDNAD, holding the profiles of about 4.1 million people, is one of the biggest in the world. Police officers in the UK can take and retain a DNA sample from any person who is arrested for a recordable offence and detained at a police station,1 and DNA profiles can be retained even if a person is not charged or is acquitted.2
DNA analysis is undoubtedly a powerful investigative tool; the existence of wide powers to take and retain DNA profiles has significant value for the investigation and detection of crime. DNA was crucial, for example, in securing convictions for the murders of Damilola Taylor, Peter Falconio, Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman. Looking to the future, we can expect to see the development of analytical techniques capable of sequencing smaller and more degraded samples (Williams and Johnson, 2007, p. 368), and mobile technology could allow a DNA sample to be taken, analysed and searched against the NDNAD away from the police station.
Two other ‘technologies’, similarly concerned with the storage of biometric data but developed much more recently than the NDNAD, are the Facial Images National Database (FIND) and the ‘Lantern’ project. FIND, currently being piloted in three police forces, can store facial scans, distinguishing marks, scars and tattoos. Just as DNA profiles extracted from crime scenes can be checked against those on the NDNAD, images from CCTV could, in the future, be searched against FIND using facial recognition software. The Lantern project is piloting a mobile, hand-held device for taking fingerprints. Within a target time of five minutes, this device electronically scans a subject's index finger and sends this using wireless encrypted technology to the central fingerprint database. A search is conducted against the 7 million prints held on the database and possible matches are returned to the officer.3 At the police station, fingerprints can already be digitally scanned using ‘Livescan’ terminals, and added to a database known as ‘IDENT1’. This database, which supersedes the National Automated Fingerprint Identification Service (NAFIS), is currently a nation-wide finger and palm-print identification system, but it has the potential to constitute a wider ‘biometric technology platform’ for other forms of identification services.4
If the collection and storage of biometric information is one element of technological development within policing, linking stand-alone information sources to create national databases is another, and the best example of this is the ‘IMPACT’ programme. IMPACT was initiated in response to the recommendation made by the Bichard Inquiry, that a national intelligence IT system should be introduced as a matter of urgency (Bichard, 2004, p. 132). The first stage of IMPACT has involved the design and implementation of the IMPACT Nominal Index (INI); an index of people whose details appear in police records, which was deployed in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland in December 2005. The IMPACT programme will ultimately result in the development of a Police National Database which will link local and national police systems, replace the Police National Computer and constitute a one-stop shop for searching force and national information systems.5
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Ethical and social issues |
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Whilst governments have always collected data on citizens, the new technologies described here represent something different in quantity and quality to what has gone before. Qualitatively, biometric data can reveal an immense level of detail about a person (Ball, 2005, p. 91), including race, sex, ethnicity and propensity for diseases (Froomkin, 2000, p. 1495). It can probe more deeply than forms of personal data traditionally held by the state (Marx, 2002, p. 9), and thus engages the right to private life in a more profound way (Roberts and Taylor, 2005). Quantitatively, developments in technology mean that data can be collected more cheaply and easily (Van Der Ploeg, 2005); the processes for taking DNA and fingerprint samples, for example, have become increasingly innocuous, involving little mess or discomfort (McCartney, 2006, p. 190). The ease with which information can be amassed erodes traditional limitations on the amount of data that can be collected as a matter of routine, and creates a temptation to ‘widen the net and thin the mesh’ of surveillance and data collection (Marx, 2002, p. 16). The departure from individualised suspicion which this entails (Marx, 2002, p. 17) has led some to ask whether we are a nation of suspects rather than citizens (GeneWatch UK, 2005, p. 29) and others to express unease about the effect upon protections against self-incrimination (Gans, 2002).
Technologies that link existing banks of information raise their own issues of principle. Combining data, and developing new capacities to search and link information qualitatively alters the nature of information held, making it more than the sum of its previous parts (Froomkin, 2000, p. 1469). As Marx puts it, ‘meaning may reside in cross classifying discrete sources of data...that in and of themselves are not revealing’ (Marx, 2002, p. 11). The linking of databases engages the idea of ‘informational privacy’ (Froomkin, 2000, p. 1463), the ability to control the acquisition or release of information about oneself, since the linking of databases loosens both the control of the data subject, as well as that of the agency holding the information. The outcry over the inability to share intelligence information between police forces, which was revealed by the Bichard Inquiry, suggests a very high level of public support for data sharing and linking. Yet, and perhaps revealing the complexity and contention which surrounds these issues, headlines such as ‘Trust warning over personal data’6 are not uncommon7; there is a deep-seated tension amongst members of the public regarding the use of personal information, and policy makers and practitioners should not lose sight of this.
The complex ethical dilemmas surrounding the NDNAD cannot be adequately covered in a piece as short as this, and we have no ambition to discuss them here, save to mention that the issues which are proving particularly controversial in contemporary debates include the overrepresentation of young, black men on the database, and the retention of the profiles of people (including children) who were not subsequently charged, prosecuted or cautioned for an offence.8 Here again, however, we see some disjuncture in public opinion; on one hand, welcoming the use of DNA when it secures convictions for high profile and serious crimes, but on the other hand fearing the implications of so much genetic information being stored by the state. This resonates with what Lazer calls the ‘enigmatic’ character of DNA in the criminal justice system; as both a diviner of guilt and a potential threat to liberty (Lazer, 2004).
Finally, the use of mobile devices by the police gives rise to some specific ethical and social issues. Hand-held crime scene techniques make the police responsible for the analytical process as well as the interpretation of results; mobile DNA sampling, for example, could remove the sense of independence which comes from laboratory analysis (Watson, 2000). At present, the fingerprints taken using hand-held devices are not used as the evidential fingerprint in court, which would require the involvement of an expert. It also important that collecting biometric information ‘in the field’ is not seen to compromise the rights and protections which would be afforded at a police station (Lazer and Meyer, 2004, p. 378).9 With this is mind, Lantern, the mobile fingerprinting device, has been designed to provide a clear audit trail.
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Technology, legitimacy and due process |
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The police need public support and cooperation in order to be effective in their order maintenance role; policing relies on the fact that most of the time, most members of the public voluntarily obey and support the police (Tyler, 2004, p. 85). Studies suggest that this essential public support and cooperation depends upon judgements about the legitimacy of the police, and that such judgements are separate, and in addition, to judgements about how effective the police are (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003, p. 534; Tyler, 2004, p. 84). When the public view an institution as legitimate, they defer to and obey it because they agree and consent to it, rather than because the institution can exercise instruments of reward or coercion (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003, p. 514).
Perceptions of the legitimacy of the police are linked to ideas of ‘procedural justice’; the fairness of the processes through which the police make decisions and exercise authority (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003, p. 514). People's desire for fair treatment at the hands of authorities has been shown to operate separately from their desire that an interaction with an authority, like the police, has a favourable outcome; ‘being treated fairly by authorities, even whilst being sanctioned by them, influences... a person's view of the legitimacy’ of that authority (Brame and Sherman, 1997, p. 165). Arguments in relation to new technologies, however, focus upon questions of performance, efficiency and the reduction of bureaucracy, and sometimes neglect issues of fairness and legitimacy. We argue that questions of the effectiveness of these technologies cannot, and should not, be separated from discussion of their ethical and social implications, because if new technologies damage police legitimacy, and therefore public support for and cooperation with the police, they will not be effective.
One starting point for an investigation of the potential for new technologies to impact upon legitimacy, is to consider some elements of procedural justice (Leventhal, 1980). One such element is the ability to make representations, take part in decision-making processes and put one's case. Two ways in which this could be compromised by new technologies come to mind. Firstly, there is a perception that increases in police and government powers to collect and store personal information have proceeded with insufficient public debate (although, as we explain below, this perception is not entirely fair). Secondly, many of the new technologies, such as Lantern or the collection of DNA and facial images, will be employed as a matter of routine whenever someone comes into contact with the police, and thus might leave little scope for representation (at least at the time of collection) as to whether the data should be taken or not—hence the importance of an audit trial and transparent monitoring of data. A related, further, element of procedural justice, the idea of ‘correctability’ (the ability to appeal and change decisions), is also relevant here, since this might, for example, be in conflict with the permanency of samples on the NDNAD. In response to these kind of concerns, it should be pointed out that there is already some scope to make representations regarding data collection; the Data Protection Act 1998 provides citizens with the power to challenge the accuracy of the data held, and in certain prescribed circumstances citizens can make a request for their DNA or fingerprint samples to be removed from police databases.10 Space prohibits further discussion as to whether these provisions satisfy the requirements of procedural justice, or importantly, as to whether these provisions are perceived as sufficient by members of the public.
Consistency and impartiality—other constituents of procedural justice—could be challenged by the overrepresentation of certain sections of the population on official databases. Accuracy, on the other hand, could be enhanced by technological developments through improved abilities to determine identity, or impaired, if larger databases give rise to errors (Chan, 2003, p. 674). Lastly, whether the use of new technologies complies with the idea of ‘ethicality’, which involves treating citizens with respect and dignity, will largely depend on how frontline officers use and portray technologies. Such day-to-day interactive factors are likely to be highly influential in shaping public perceptions of new technologies.
Along with the potential to damage procedural justice, however, new technologies also have the potential to enhance it, by providing audit trails and documentary evidence of policing activities (Marx, 2002, p. 22). The important point is that merely claiming that these technologies make the police more efficient provides only a partial account of their implications for policing, since factual issues of the effectiveness of technologically enhanced policing methods cannot be separated from normative issues of the acceptability and consequences of those technologies (Williams and Johnson, 2007). These normative issues might have implications for perceptions of police legitimacy, and therefore require careful consideration by police leaders and those responsible for the governance and oversight of the police.
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Moving forward |
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TopIntroductionSome examples of 'new...Ethical and social issuesTechnology, legitimacy and due...Moving forwardReferences |
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It is by no means our intention in this article to suggest that the challenges which new technologies may pose to legitimacy are absolute or beyond solution. In fact, in this short paper we have suggested ways in which several of these challenges can be approached. Once these issues are recognised (and recognition is something we hope to have furthered in this article), we can move to account for and address these concerns. The answer is likely to lie, at least in part, in the management and oversight of these technologies, rather than in a reduction in their use. As a starting point, we suggest four factors which should be attended to by any regime of governance.
Integrity
Information systems and databases must have integrity, in that they must be accurate, reliable and secure. There must also be clear and transparent rules governing the sharing of information with other jurisdictions, and the access which organisations outside the public sector criminal justice agencies have to information.
Outcomes
The value added by new technologies to various aspects of policing must be identified and demonstrated. Rigorous, independent research and evaluation should accompany the roll-out of new technologies as a matter of course (Tracy and Morgan, 2000, p. 689; Williams and Johnson, 2007, p. 373). Importantly, this research must consider factual questions (such as cost effectiveness, impact upon police performance and how that impact could be improved) as well as wider social and ethical questions and issues of legitimacy.
Transparency
It is important that there is transparency in way that systems and databases are governed and as to the rules that guide and constrain them. Information about policing technologies should be openly available to public to encourage understanding.
Public confidence
It is vital that the public have trust and confidence in these technologies. This will partly be facilitated by the above three factors. It will also be affected by media portrayal of policing methods.
The tension between tackling crime and civil liberties, between the means and ends of crime control (Delattre, 2002) and regarding the contested boundaries of police authority, are age-old; the use of new technologies in policing is partly a contemporary manifestation of this debate. We have argued that the use of new technologies has the potential to damage the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public, and this, in turn, could reduce the effectiveness of these technologies in preventing and detecting crime, through reducing the public's willingness to cooperate with the police.
Many of the concerns voiced about the use of policing technology in the UK relate to the perception of a lack of debate; that, in the words of the Information Commissioner, we are ‘sleepwalking into a surveillance society’. The relationship between policing and technology is a matter of power, and as such, is an important subject of debate in democratic societies (Nogala, 1995). In the UK, this perception of a lack of public debate is a curious one, given that the expansion of the use of DNA in policing, for example, has been very publicly set out in a series of White Papers and in legislation. However, as debates about the use of DNA and human genetics in medicine have highlighted, there is a constant need for police leaders and the government to go the extra mile in provoking and sustaining the debate, providing information and listening to concerns. Openness, discussion and research will all be vital to the way in which new technologies are managed and governed.
There are already very positive signs of increased openness and debate, which hint at the development of institutional mechanisms which will foster continuing debate about the issues these technologies raise; the creation of a new DNA Ethics Committee was announced by the Home Office in March 2007; the use and storage of biometric data is being considered as part of the Government's review of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Home Office, 2007), the NDNAD is to be subject to a ‘Citizens’ Inquiry’ conducted by the Human Genetics Commission,11 and the Home Affairs Select Committee is conducting an inquiry into the idea of a surveillance society.12 The Nuffield Council Report on Bioethics (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2006) is a welcome, informed contribution to public debate, bringing together perspectives from government, the police service and human rights organisations and providing independent and authoritative commentary.
New technologies have the potential to revolutionise policing. We need to match our attention to their crime-control effects with equal consideration of the ways in which they are portrayed and perceived by the public.
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Notes |
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This article presents the substance of Peter Neyroud's Sir Leon Radzinowicz Visiting Fellowship Lecture at the University of Cambridge, May 2008.
1 The power to take samples is contained in Section 63 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984. Section 82 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 amended PACE, extending the power to retain samples. Section 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 authorises samples to be taken from anyone arrested for a recordable offence. 
2 Space precludes a more detailed description of the NDNAD. For more information, see http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/organisation/directorate-search/crcsg/ppod/fspu/national-dna-database-documents and Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (2006). See McCartney (2006) for details of the DNA expansion programme.
3 Section 117 of The Serious Crime Act 2005 allows the police to take fingerprint scans using portable equipment from an individual prior to arrest, where their identity cannot be established by other means.
4 See http://www.npia.police.uk/en/5969.htm for more information.
5 For more information, see http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/operational-policing/impact/ and http://www.npia.police.uk/en/8489.htm
6 BBC News website, 13 July 2006.
7 See also The Independent, ID cards could be used for mass surveillance system, 18 August 2005.
8 For a flavour of the coverage of the NDNAD in the media, see BBC News Website, All UK ‘must be on DNA database’, 6 September 2007; The Independent, Growing DNA databases ‘turning Britain into a nation of suspects’, 1 November 2006; The Times, Police want DNA from speeding drivers and litterbugs on database, 2 August 2007; The Telegraph, DNA data deal ‘will create big brother Europe’, 18 February 2007; The Guardian, Police may be given power to take DNA samples in the street, 2 August 2007.
9 Home Office (2007), p. 12.
10 There is a procedure through which profiles can be removed from the NDNAD in ‘exceptional circumstances’. See http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/organisation/directorate-search/crcsg/ppod/fspu/national-dna-database-documents and ACPO (2006) for details.
11 Human Genetics Commission press release, 1 August 2007, ‘HGC launches tender exercise for Citizen's Inquiry’. Available at http://www.hgc.gov.uk.
12 http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/home_affairs_committee/surveillance_society.cfm
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